JERUSALEM — If you have ever given to Doctors Without Borders, you have funded an organization that one government now treats as a security-screening problem and another country's lawyers have asked to have formally considered for proscription as a terrorist entity.
Neither claim is a court finding. Both, however, are real, dated, documented events — and they sit at the ends of the same graph.
What follows is built from an evidence network of 133 entities and 188 relationships assembled for this investigation: Israeli government resolutions, a Supreme Court judgment, a 37-organization deregistration list, three staff allegations, hospital incident reports, financial filings, and a September 2026 referral to the UK Home Office. Every edge is labeled by confidence — verified, reported, or alleged — and the distinction matters throughout. This is a map of who did and said what to whom. It is not a finding that Médecins Sans Frontières or any named person knowingly supported an armed group.
Read as a network rather than as headlines, it contains relationships most readers would never have guessed.
Table of Contents
- The ministry you would least expect now vets aid workers
- The 37: a who's-who of the aid industry, not a suspects list
- The quiet paradox: the deregistered sued inside Israel's own court system
- Three employees, and the detail nobody can unsee: all were dead before the accusations
- The armed men MSF would not name
- The London endgame: asking the state to proscribe a Nobel laureate
- The precedent that should make every government pause
- The money: a charity almost nobody funds with government grants
- What the graph does not say
The ministry you would least expect now vets aid workers
In December 2024, the Israeli Cabinet adopted Government Resolution 2542. On the surface, a bureaucratic transfer: responsibility for registering international humanitarian organizations and recommending their foreign staff moved away from the Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs — the soft-spokesbody that had handled it — to a new inter-ministerial team.
Here is the part that surprised me. The team is chaired by the Director-General of the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism — the ministry built around Holocaust remembrance and global antisemitism diplomacy, led by minister Amichai Chikli. It is also the ministry that publicly announced the deregistration decision. Humanitarian access to Gaza and the West Bank is now gated, on paper, by the antisemitism ministry.
The team's roster reads less like an aid-eligibility committee than like a security cabinet: the Shin Bet internal security agency, the Israel Police, the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Settlement and National Missions, the National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, COGAT (the military's territorial-administration body), the Population and Immigration Authority, and the Foreign Ministry all hold seats. The registration procedure published on 9 March 2025 makes the implications concrete: applicants must surrender staff names, contact details, passport numbers for foreign workers, and Israeli ID numbers for Palestinian employees — and denial grounds include a link to a designated organization, support for armed struggle, incitement to racism, and "denying Israel's Jewish and democratic character."
The registration machine
flowchart TD
accTitle: Israeli bodies behind the NGO registration regime
accDescr: Government Resolution 2542 moved international humanitarian NGO registration from the Welfare Ministry to an inter-ministerial team chaired by the Diaspora Affairs Ministry, with security and settlement bodies represented.
Cabinet["Israeli Cabinet"] -->|Adopted 9 Dec 2024| Res2542["Government Resolution 2542"]
Res2542 -->|Established| Team["Inter-ministerial registration team"]
Diaspora["Ministry for Diaspora Affairs<br/>and Combating Antisemitism"] -->|Chairs| Team
Welfare["Ministry of Welfare<br/>and Social Affairs"] -->|Transferred registration duty to| Team
ShinBet["Shin Bet"] -->|Represented on| Team
Police["Israel Police"] -->|Represented on| Team
NSM["Ministry of National Security"] -->|Represented on| Team
Settler["Ministry of Settlement<br/>and National Missions"] -->|Represented on| Team
NBCTF["National Bureau for<br/>Counter Terror Financing"] -->|Represented on| Team
COGAT["COGAT"] -->|Represented on| Team
PopAuth["Population and<br/>Immigration Authority"] -->|Represented on| Team
MFA["Foreign Ministry"] -->|Represented on| Team
Team -->|Administers| Proc["Registration procedure<br/>of 9 March 2025"]
Proc -->|Requires| Data["Staff names, contact details,<br/>passports for foreigners,<br/>Israeli IDs for Palestinian staff"]
Proc -->|Applied in| Decert["Non-renewal of 37 NGOs<br/>announced 30 Dec 2025"]
Edges show statutory or announced roles described in the underlying records; representation on the team does not imply each body voted on each decision.
A second layer runs in parallel: COGAT publishes a separate Gaza aid-organization examination process aimed at preventing diversion to Hamas or other designated groups. One ministry regime for legal registration, one military regime for physical aid access — and an NGO can be cleared by one and blocked by the other.
The 37: a who's-who of the aid industry, not a suspects list
The first real test of the machinery came at the end of 2025. Israel announced that 37 organizations had not met the new requirements; their credentials expired on 31 December 2025, and the rules demanded they cease activities and remove staff within 60 days. COGAT argued the listed groups handled less than 1 percent of aid entering Gaza — a claim meant to shrink the story that critics used to blow it up.
The list itself is the shock. This is not a fringe dossier. It includes World Vision International, the American-founded evangelical relief giant. CARE International. Mercy Corps. The International Rescue Committee, founded at Franklin Roosevelt's urging in 1944. Oxfam Novib. The Norwegian and Danish Refugee Councils. Handicap International. Caritas Internationalis and Caritas Jerusalem — the Catholic Church's aid arm. The American Friends Service Committee, the Quaker organization that won the 1947 Nobel Peace Prize. Medical Aid for Palestinians UK. Médecins du Monde's French and Swiss sections. And four national sections of MSF itself: France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain.
Being on this list establishes an administrative status — a failure to satisfy a registration procedure. It does not establish armed-group affiliation for any of the 37. But the graph shows something the public conversation mostly misses: the deregistration net swept in some of the most establishment organizations on earth, including organizations whose donor base is precisely the general-public charity audience that "terror-linked NGO" rhetoric is designed to frighten.
The mainstream names on the list
flowchart TD
accTitle: Selected organizations named in the 37-NGO non-renewal event
accDescr: A sample of organizations included in Israel's December 2025 non-renewal announcement, grouped by sector. Listing is an administrative status, not a finding of armed-group affiliation.
Event["Non-renewal of 37 NGOs<br/>credentials expired 31 Dec 2025"]
Medical["Medical"] --> Event
Event --- MSF4["MSF France, Belgium,<br/>Netherlands, Spain"]
Event --- MdM["Médecins du Monde<br/>France, Switzerland"]
Event --- MAP["Medical Aid for<br/>Palestinians UK"]
Relief["Mass relief"] --> Event
Event --- WV["World Vision International"]
Event --- CARE["CARE International"]
Event --- IRC["International Rescue Committee"]
Event --- MC["Mercy Corps"]
Event --- OX["Oxfam Novib"]
Refuge["Refugee & rights"] --> Event
Event --- NRC["Norwegian Refugee Council"]
Event --- DRC["Danish Refugee Council"]
Event --- HI["Humanity & Inclusion"]
Event --- DCI["Defense for Children International"]
Faith["Faith-based"] --> Event
Event --- Caritas["Caritas Internationalis<br/>& Caritas Jerusalem"]
Event --- AFSC["American Friends<br/>Service Committee (Quakers)"]
Event --- NEC["Near East Council of Churches"]
Grouping is editorial, for readability; all edges simply mean "named in the 37-organization announcement."
The quiet paradox: the deregistered sued inside Israel's own court system
The most counterintuitive structure in the graph is what the aid groups did next. They did not go public with a siege narrative. Twenty organizations — including all four deregistered MSF sections, CARE, Oxfam Novib, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Médecins du Monde, and the network AIDA — filed joined petitions in the Israeli Supreme Court (Case 69668-02-26, heard as part of the February 2026 filing), asking Israel's own judiciary to strike down Israel's own registration requirements.
The organizations argued the demand for personal staff data would expose Palestinian employees to security retaliation and end their work. It is a strange posture, visible plainly only in the graph: the same nodes carry -[NAMED_IN]-> edges to the deregistration event and -[FILED_OR_JOINED]-> edges into the litigation against it. Locked out of the registration system, they litigated their way back in — inside the state that locked them out.
On 19 May 2026, a panel of justices Isaac Amit, Gila Canfy-Steinitz, and Noam Sohlberg rejected the challenge to the employee-information requirement and gave the petitioners 30 days to complete the required submissions, with an interim order in place during the window.
What the judgment did not do matters more than what it did. It was not a finding that MSF employed fighters, nor a ruling that the staff allegations are true. Its holding concerns registration authority, privacy, and data submission — and UN Special Procedures experts, in a December 2025 communication, had already flagged the procedure's due-process and access risks before the ruling landed.
One set of organizations, two system edges
flowchart TD
accTitle: Organizations both deregistered and petitioning the court
accDescr: Several of the 37 deregistered organizations, including four MSF sections, simultaneously filed joined petitions in Israel's Supreme Court challenging the registration requirements that named them.
subgraph Petitioners["Selected joint petitioners (Case 69668-02-26)"]
MSFFr["MSF France"]
MSFBe["MSF Belgium"]
MSFNl["MSF Netherlands"]
MSFSp["MSF Spain"]
CARE2["CARE International"]
Oxfam["Oxfam Novib"]
NRC2["Norwegian Refugee Council"]
AIDA["AIDA (network)"]
end
Decert2["37-NGO non-renewal event"]
Pet["Joined Supreme Court petition<br/>filed Feb 2026"]
Court["Supreme Court of Israel<br/>Justices Amit, Canfy-Steinitz, Sohlberg"]
Ruling["19 May 2026 ruling:<br/>data requirement upheld,<br/>30-day compliance window"]
MSFFr -->|Named in| Decert2
MSFBe -->|Named in| Decert2
MSFNl -->|Named in| Decert2
MSFSp -->|Named in| Decert2
MSFFr -->|Filed or joined| Pet
MSFBe -->|Filed or joined| Pet
MSFNl -->|Filed or joined| Pet
MSFSp -->|Filed or joined| Pet
CARE2 -->|Filed or joined| Pet
Oxfam -->|Filed or joined| Pet
NRC2 -->|Filed or joined| Pet
AIDA -->|Filed or joined, and represented network| Pet
Pet -->|Resolved by| Court
Court -->|Issued| Ruling
Every listed petitioner that was also among the 37 carries both edges; the diagram samples, not exhaustively lists, the overlapping set.
Three employees, and the detail nobody can unsee: all were dead before the accusations
The emotional core of the graph is three people. All worked for MSF. All are dead. And the sequence of dates is the single most unnerving pattern in the dataset.
Fadi Al-Wadiya, an MSF physiotherapist, was killed on 25 June 2024 — MSF says by an Israeli strike — while cycling to an MSF clinic in Khan Younis. Israeli authorities alleged within a day that he was a Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative. PIJ itself publicly identified him as a member only on 24 February 2026, some twenty months after his death, with reports quoting its military wing naming him a "martyred commander" and deputy head of its military-manufacturing unit. MSF's own response acknowledges the PIJ statement — while stressing it establishes nothing about what MSF knew while employing him, and notes Israel shared no formal evidence with MSF before or after his death. MSF is seeking an independent inquiry.
Nasser Hamdi Abdelatif Al Shalfouh, an MSF driver who joined in March 2023, was wounded by shrapnel in Jabalia on 8 October 2024 and died two days later. On 2 January 2026 — fourteen months after his death — an official Israeli Foreign Ministry account described him as a Hamas sniper. MSF says he had not been working since the war began; the collected sources found no independent corroboration of the sniper claim.
Mahmoud Abu Nujaila, an MSF doctor, is the third case, and the evidence profile is different again: the specific assertion that he led a PFLP-linked health association comes from NGO Monitor, a research-and-advocacy organization. MSF acknowledged Israeli authorities had raised allegations about him. No court has resolved the underlying claim, and the graph records it at the lowest confidence tier: alleged.
One more sequence the graph makes visible: in every case, the accusation followed the funeral. Whether or not each individual had the alleged affiliation, the institutional claim — that MSF should have known — is being made about people whom MSF employed while alive and whom the accusing state is describing posthumously, with the evidence trail, by MSF's account, never shown to the employer.
Posthumous allegation timeline
flowchart TD
accTitle: Dates of death versus dates of allegation for three MSF employees
accDescr: All three named MSF employees died before the specific public allegations attached to them, and before PIJ's own membership statement for Fadi Al-Wadiya. Allegations remain allegations; none was adjudicated in a court.
W1["Fadi Al-Wadiya employed<br/>by MSF as physiotherapist"] --> W2["Killed 25 Jun 2024<br/>cycling to MSF clinic"]
W2 --> W3["Israeli authorities allege<br/>PIJ role: 26 Jun 2024"]
W3 --> W4["PIJ publicly identifies him<br/>as a member: 24 Feb 2026"]
S1["Nasser Al Shalfouh joins<br/>MSF as driver: Mar 2023"] --> S2["Dies 10 Oct 2024<br/>of Jabalia shrapnel wounds"]
S2 --> S3["Israeli MFA labels him<br/>a Hamas sniper: 2 Jan 2026"]
A1["Mahmoud Abu Nujaila<br/>MSF doctor"] --> A2["Israeli authorities raise<br/>armed-group allegations"]
A2 --> A3["NGO Monitor alleges<br/>PFLP-linked association<br/>leadership: 24 Feb 2026"]
W4 --> Meta["Pattern: every specific<br/>public allegation is dated<br/>after the person's death"]
S3 --> Meta
A3 --> Meta
PIJ's acknowledgement is an organizational statement of membership reported by MSF; the Israeli MFA claim is attributed and uncorroborated in the collected sources; the NGO Monitor claim is advocacy, not a judicial finding.
The armed men MSF would not name
The graph contains one cluster that fits nobody's script. In January 2026, MSF reported armed — sometimes masked — men in parts of the Nasser Medical Complex compound in Khan Younis, intimidation, arbitrary arrests of patients, and one suspected weapons-movement incident. It suspended non-critical work on 20 January and resumed core activities on 13 April after reported improvements.
Two edges make this strange. First, MSF told AP it could not identify the armed men's affiliation — so the incident belongs to no one's "Hamas hospitals" or "IDF strikes" narrative. Second, Nasser Hospital's own management publicly rejected MSF's account as unsubstantiated — one of the rare times in this dataset where a Gaza institution disputed a humanitarian NGO's testimony rather than amplifying it. And a third edge complicates it further: MSF coordinated its resumed medical work with the Gaza Ministry of Health — a ministry under Hamas civil administration, per the graph's reported attribution edge.
The result is a shape the public debate cannot hold: MSF simultaneously refuses to blame Hamas for the armed men, coordinates with Hamas-run ministries for patient access, and fights the accusation that it sheltered armed group members. All three things are true in the evidence map. Advocacy campaigns on both sides each use one and hide the others.
The Nasser Hospital triangle
flowchart TD
accTitle: Competing accounts around the Nasser Hospital security incident
accDescr: MSF reported armed men without naming their affiliation, hospital management disputed MSF's account, and MSF coordinated medical work with the Gaza Ministry of Health, which is under Hamas civil administration.
MSF["MSF"] -->|Reported armed men,<br/>intimidations, arrests| Incident["Nasser Hospital<br/>security incidents, Jan 2026"]
Incident -->|Occurred at| Nasser["Nasser Medical Complex"]
Nasser -->|Publicly disputed| Incident
MSF -->|Declined to attribute<br/>armed men to Hamas| Incident
MSF -->|Suspended then<br/>resumed core work| Nasser
MSF -->|Coordinated medical work with| MoH["Gaza Ministry of Health"]
Hamas["Hamas"] -.->|Reported civil administration| MoH
The dashed edge reflects the graph's reported attribution of administration, not a judicial finding about the affiliation of any individual at the hospital.
The London endgame: asking the state to proscribe a Nobel laureate
The final bridge runs from Jerusalem to London.
MSF holds the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize. On 10 September 2026, its veteran figure Dr. Natalie Roberts, executive director of MSF UK, published an open letter to Britain's leaders — addressed in the records to Andy Burnham and Ed Miliband — calling for an end to military cooperation with Israel and suspension of arms transfers.
Two days later, on 12 September 2026, UK Lawyers for Israel (UKLFI) wrote to the Home Office, the Charity Commission, and the Fundraising Regulator. It asked the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, to consider proscribing MSF under the Terrorism Act 2000 — the same statutory mechanism by which Hamas (wholly proscribed November 2021) and PIJ (proscribed March 2001) are designated terrorist organizations in the UK — citing the Israeli allegations about Al-Wadiya and Al Shalfouh as predicate material.
The graph's discipline matters here. As of the 23 September 2026 cut-off: the Charity Commission said it was "actively assessing" the concerns; the Fundraising Regulator said it was assessing a complaint; the Home Office list reviewed contains Hamas and PIJ — and does not contain MSF. A proscription request is not a proscription. But the request itself is the node most readers would never have guessed existed: a lawyer-backed campaign to route a 2.6-billion-euro, 7.5-million-donor medical charity through the same legal test as an armed movement.
The proscription pathway — a request, not a designation
flowchart TD
accTitle: UKLFI's September 2026 referral and the UK bodies that received it
accDescr: UKLFI asked the Home Secretary to consider proscribing MSF under the Terrorism Act 2000 and complained to two regulators. Requests and assessments are shown; no proscription of MSF is recorded as of the research cut-off.
Acc1["Israeli allegations:<br/>Al-Wadiya, Al Shalfouh"]
UKLFI["UK Lawyers for Israel"] -->|Cited in campaign| Acc1
UKLFI -->|Submitted 12 Sep 2026| Ref["Proscription referral"]
Ref -->|Asked to consider| HS["Home Secretary<br/>Shabana Mahmood"]
HS -->|Leads| HO["Home Office"]
HO -->|Publishes| Test["Terrorism Act 2000<br/>proscription test"]
Test -->|Currently applies to| HamasP["Hamas (Nov 2021)<br/>PIJ (Mar 2001)"]
Test -.->|MSF absent from<br/>list as of 23 Sep 2026| MSFUK2["MSF UK"]
Ref -->|Complaint to| CC["Charity Commission"]
Ref -->|Complaint to| FR["Fundraising Regulator"]
CC -->|Actively assessing| Ref
FR -->|Assessing complaint| Ref
MSF -->|Rejected the claims| Ref
Solid edges are dated filings and stated roles. Nothing on this diagram constitutes a finding that MSF meets the statutory test.
The precedent that should make every government pause
The graph carries one sub-network that predates MSF entirely — and predicts it. On 19 October 2021, Israel's Defense Ministry designated six prominent Palestinian civil-society organizations — Addameer, Al-Haq, the Bisan Center, Defense for Children International–Palestine, the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, and the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees — as terrorist organizations on an alleged PFLP affiliation basis.
Nine months later, on 12 July 2022, the foreign ministries of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden issued a joint statement that is the single most consequential evidentiary sentence in the dataset: they had received no substantial information from Israel justifying a change in their policy toward the six, and would continue cooperating with them.
The graph connects that episode to the present only through shared machinery — NBCTF announced the 2021 designations and sits on the 2024 registration team; the same designation-plus-documentation pattern recurs. It pointedly does not connect those six NGOs to MSF. The reader is left with the structural lesson: in this domain, a terrorist designation by one government has already been examined by nine allied governments and found evidentially wanting. That is a reason for caution about accepting any designation — Israel's, or one requested in London — as a settled fact.
Two designation episodes, one pattern
flowchart TD
accTitle: The 2021 CSO designations and the European states' response
accDescr: Israel designated six Palestinian civil-society organizations in 2021 alleging PFLP links; nine European foreign ministries said in 2022 Israel provided no substantial information justifying policy change. The episode connects to the MSF story only through shared authorities, not through MSF itself.
Israel2["State of Israel"] -->|Designated 19 Oct 2021| Six["Six Palestinian CSOs:<br/>Addameer, Al-Haq, Bisan,<br/>DCI-P, UAWC, UPWC"]
NBCTF2["National Bureau for<br/>Counter Terror Financing"] -->|Announced| Six
Six -->|Asserted affiliation basis| PFLP["PFLP"]
Nine["Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,<br/>Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,<br/>Spain, Sweden"] -->|Joint statement 12 Jul 2022| NoInfo["'No substantial information'<br/>justifying policy change"]
NoInfo -->|Challenged evidentiary basis of| Six
NBCTF2 -.->|Same bureau now sits on| Team2["2024 NGO registration team"]
The dashed edge marks institutional continuity of the announcing bureau, not a legal or evidentiary link between the 2021 designations and MSF.
The money: a charity almost nobody funds with government grants
If the allegations were about money, the graph would show finance. It mostly shows the opposite.
MSF's audited international figures for 2025 record operating income above €2.6 billion, of which 98 percent came from private sources — more than 7.5 million individual donors and private institutions. Public institutional income in the 2024 audited accounts totals €25.3 million against €2.313 billion in private income; named public sources include Canada, Switzerland, the Global Fund, and Unitaid. The graph found no private company or investor node behind the controversy at all: this is a donor-funded organism, which is precisely why the Charity Commission and Fundraising Regulator referrals sting — they target the donation channel itself.
The UK leg: MSF UK reported £95.34 million of 2024 income and £58.7 million in grants to other MSF sections, of which £56.6 million supported medical humanitarian work. The 2024 Palestine programme spent €85.1 million movement-wide — not a Gaza-only figure. No public record reviewed here discloses a UK-to-Gaza transfer amount. The books are open, granular, audited — and still do not contain the line item that either side of the argument keeps implicitly invoking.
Where MSF's money comes from and goes
flowchart TD
accTitle: MSF income and grant structure per audited records
accDescr: The vast majority of MSF income is private donations. MSF UK's 2024 filing shows grants to other MSF sections but no Gaza-specific amount is publicly disclosed in the records reviewed.
Donors["7.5M+ individual donors<br/>and private institutions"] -->|"98% of income"| MSFI["MSF International<br/>EUR 2.6B+ operating income, 2025"]
Public["Canada, Switzerland,<br/>Global Fund, Unitaid"] -->|"EUR 25.3M public income, 2024"| MSFI
MSFI -->|Operates| Pal["Palestine programme<br/>EUR 85.1M expenditure, 2024"]
MSFUK["MSF UK<br/>GBP 95.34M income, 2024"] -->|Grants| Sections["Other MSF sections"]
Sections -->|For medical<br/>humanitarian work| MSFI
UKLFI2["UKLFI complaint<br/>12 Sep 2026"] -.->|Targets regulators of| MSFUK
CC2["Charity Commission<br/>& Fundraising Regulator"] -.->|Assessing| UKLFI2
Solid edges are audited figures from MSF's filings; dashed edges are pending regulatory assessments, not findings. No Gaza-specific UK transfer appears in the records.
What the graph does not say
The discipline of an evidence map is its refusals. It does not say MSF knowingly employed combatants — its densest allegations carry the alleged tag, and its verified edges are procedural. It does not say the three named employees' claims are false either; PIJ's own membership statement about Al-Wadiya is in the record, reported by MSF itself. It does not say any of the 37 deregistered organizations has armed-group ties — the list is stuffed with household-name charities that millions of ordinary donors support. It does not say the Supreme Court of Israel found for the state on anything but registration authority. It does not say the UK Home Office has done anything beyond receive a request.
What it does say is structural, and it is the part the general public would not guess from headlines on either side:
- A ministry for combating antisemitism, sharing a committee table with the Shin Bet and a settlement ministry, now converts humanitarian credentials into personal-data disclosures about Palestinian employees — a design that UN experts and the petitioners' own privacy brief warned hands names to the very security apparatus that accused three of their dead colleagues.
- The organizations caught in the machine responded by suing inside that machine's own courts — and lost on procedure while the factual accusations went unadjudicated.
- Every specific staff allegation is dated after the accused person's death, and the armed group's only self-acknowledgement came 20 months late.
- The campaign's endpoint is British statutory terrorism law being pointed, by request, at a Nobel-Prize-winning charity funded almost entirely by ordinary household donations.
- And the closest historical analogue — the 2021 six-NGO designations — was examined on the evidence by nine European governments and found unsubstantiated by what Israel supplied.
The loop, if there is one, closes here: an accusation against three dead Gaza employees, transmitted through a deregistration procedure, a Supreme Court filing, an open letter to Britain's leaders, and two days later a letter to a British Home Secretary, asking her to weigh whether a 60-year-old medical charity meets the same legal test as Hamas. None of those edges is a conviction. All of them are on the ledger.
Sources and further reading
- Israeli Government Resolution 2542 and registration procedure, gov.il inter-ministerial team page; registration guidelines PDF.
- Supreme Court judgment, joined cases including AIDA and 20 aid organizations, Case 69668-02-26 (19 May 2026), full-text mirror.
- AP list of the 37 affected organizations and AP report on the non-renewal decision.
- MSF statements: on sharing staff information, response on Fadi Al-Wadiya, statement on the killing of Fadi Al-Wadiya, Gaza FAQ, resumption at Nasser Hospital.
- PIJ membership confirmation reported by JNS; Israeli MFA post on Al Shalfouh, archived copy.
- UN Special Procedures communication on the registration procedure.
- UKLFI referral and regulator responses via Telegraph/AOL syndication; MSF's rejection reported by The New Arab; Home Office proscribed-organizations list.
- Nasser Hospital's denial of MSF's account, reported by Al Jazeera.
- Israel's 2021 designation of six organizations; nine-state joint statement; EU spokesperson statement.
- NGO Monitor report on MSF (advocacy source, recorded as alleged).
- MSF 2025 international figures; MSF audited financial report 2024; Charity Commission record for MSF UK; MSF UK annual report 2024.
Built from a 133-node, 188-edge evidence graph with research cut-off 23 September 2026. Edge confidence labels (verified / reported / alleged) are preserved from the underlying dataset.